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The Rules of the Game: “Play In The Joints” Between the Religion
Clauses
Sharon Keller†

In law, as in life, there is a good deal of ambivalence about playing. Play, as the
portal to innovation and creativity, can be the enemy of settled expectations and
predictability. In the recent case of Locke v. Davey,1 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, appealed to “play in the joints” metaphor famously used in Walz v. Tax
Commission of N.Y.2 as an aid in constitutional balancing of apparently competing
constitutional religion clause claims, saying:
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72 U.S.L.W. 4206, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004)
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The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely
straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions,
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none
commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the
First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will
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These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, are frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that ‘there is
room for play in the joints’ between them. In other words, there are
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not
required by the Free Exercise Clause.
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One of the more important tasks of law is to define and defend the expectations
we loosely call rights,4 consequently it is unsettling to find “play” as an operant feature of
a legal rule describing the interaction of two important constitutional clauses -- the clause
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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72 U.S.L.W. at ___; 124 S.Ct at 1313
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I say “loosely-called rights” not because I will be contending that the term is very vague, but

because one could coherently take a position that the expectations discussed in this article,
particularly those in the discussion regarding conditioned benefits at section III infra, do not rise
to the level of right but are more properly viewed as “expectations” or “privileges.”

These

arguments will be addressed in the aforementioned section. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of
the introduction that it will be contended in that section that the consequences of such
disappointed expectations need not rise to the level of right to have legal consequences in this
instance.
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prohibiting the establishment of religion and the clause guaranteeing rights to the free
exercise of religion.
Specifically, in the Locke case, the “play” arose when a governmental
disbursement that benefited a religious institution passed muster under the establishment
clause because of the intervention of a private choice by an individual. Such sanitizing
choices are a key determinant for a line of establishment clause cases, most recently
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
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that found government disbursements to religious

organizations via such choices constitutional. Hereinafter such choice mechanisms will
be termed “Zelman choices” for convenience.
I will argue in this article that Locke is an exemplar of the new generation of
Establishment clause cases that have written into law a sort of safe harbor, private choice,
for governmental benefits that find their way into
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536 U.S. 639 (2002)
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